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REGULATORY TAKINGS -
THE WEAK AND THE
STRONG
byJ. PATRICK SULLIVAN
In recent years, concern over environ-
mental quality has prompted a spate of
regulations designed to safeguard land,'
air,2 and water.3 In some instances, these
regulations have been held to contravene the
takings clause of the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.4 More often,
however, environmental regulations have
withstood Fifth Amendment challengess
causing disgruntled property owners to pur-
sue nonjudicial avenues to stave off the
perceived threat of these regulations to their
private ownership rights. One such avenue
has been the state legislatures.6 Recently,
Arizona, Delaware, Indiana, Utah, and Wash-
ington have adopted laws that attempt to
stem the tide of environmental regulation.
These laws are modeled after an executive
order issued by President Reagan in 1988.8
They require state agencies to assess, before
implementing any new regulatory program,
whetherthetakings clauseof theFifthAmend-
ment will require the payment of just com-
pensation to the affected property owners.9
This approach is quite similar to the National
Environmental Policy Act,'0 which requires
federal agencies to prepare an environmen-
tal impact statement before undertaking any
major program." In Missouri, Governor
Camahan recently issued an executive order
requiring a takings assessment by state agen-
cies before they promulgate new regula-
tions.12
In many states,'3 property rights advo-
cates have succeeded in introducing legisla-
tion that goes a step further than the laws
patterned after the Reagan executive order.
Basically, this legislation would entitle a prop-
erty owner to obtain compensation auto-
matically if his or her land declined in value
by fifty percent or more as a result of a new
environmental regulation.14 "Strong" prop-
erty rights bills of this type are a response to
the recent Supreme Court decision in Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council." Al-
though Lucas sustained a landowner's chal-
lenge to an environmental regulation,' 6 the
Court stated that even a 95% decline in value
may not constitute a compensable taking,
depending on the facts of the case.'7
Environmental groups ardently oppose
both types of property rights legislation. 8
These groups foresee a major expansion in
the takings concept that could rein in envi-
ronmental regulation.' 9 This comment will
discuss the background of the regulatory
takings concept and analyze the decision in
Lucas. Next, both types of property rights
legislation will be examined. Finally, this
comment will explore the potential ramifica-
tions of property rights legislation, and con-
dude that the tension between environmen-
tal groups and property rights advocates will
escalate significantly as a result of these
statutes.
I. BACKGROUND
A) The Fifth Amendment
The Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides ". . . nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just
compensation."20 This portion of the Fifth
Amendment is known as the takings clause.
In addition to restricting the federal govern-
1 See, e.g., Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988); National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(a) (1988).
2 See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988).
3 See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act (commonly referred to as the Clean Water Act), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988).
4 See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, _U.S_, 112 S.Ct. 2886,120 LE.d.2d 798 (1992); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825. 107 S.Ct.
3141, 97 LEd.2d 677 (1987); Whitney Benefits, Inc. u. United States, 926 F.2d 1169 (1991), cert. denied, _U.S._, 112 S.Ct. 406, 116 LEd.2d 354 (1991).
5 See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 107 S.CL 1232,94 LEd.2d 472 (1978); PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74,
100 S.CL 2035,64 LEd.2d 741 (1980); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 100 S.Ct. 2138, 65 LEd.2d 106 (1980); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438
U.S. 104, 98 S.CL 2646,57 LEd. 2d 631 (1978); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365,47 S.Ct. 114, 71 LEd. 303 (1926).
6 See Marianne Lavelle, The 'Property Rights' Revolt, 15 NATL IJ. 1 (May 10, 1993).
7 Id. See also Barbara Marsh, Small Firms Win Big in Many Statehouses This Year, Wu. ST. J., Sept. 17, 1993, at All.
8 Lavelle, supm, note 6, at 34. See Exec. Order No. 12,630, 53 Fed. Reg. 8,859 (1988).
9 Lavelle, supro, note 6, at 34. See also notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
10 See supra, note 1.
11 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(1988).
12 Exec. Order No. 93-13 (July 2, 1993). This executive order was in response to Senate Bill 315. Governor Camahan vetoed this bill because 'it containled) a burdensome
review process" that would make certain decisions reviewable by the Attomey General. See Letter from Governor Mel Camahan to the Secretary of State of the State of Missouri
(July 2, 1993) (on file with the Missouri Secretary of State's office). The executive order's takings assessment requirement is not substantively different from the one in the bill.
Moreover, the executive order has essentially the same force and effect as a legislative pronouncement.
13 Washington, Idaho, Michigan, New Hampshire, South Dakota, North Dakota, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Alaska, New York. Lavelle, supra, note 6, at 34.
14 See Lavelle, supra, note 6, at 34.
15 -U.S._, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 120 LEd.2d 798 (1992).
16 _U.S._, 112 S.Ct. at 2902.
17 _U.S._ 112 S.Ct. at 2894.
18 SeeLavelle, supra note 6. at 34.
19 Id.
20 U.S. Cousr. amend. V.
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ment's power to appropriate private prop-
erty, the takings clause also is applicable to
the states via the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.21 The Fifth Amend-
ment was not intended to prohibit the taking
of property by the government; rather, it
"barjs] Government from forcing some people
alone to bear public burdens which, in all
fairness and justice, should be bome by the
public as a whole."I Thus, the government
can take private property consistent with the
Fifth Amendment, provided it pays just com-
pensation to the owner.
B) The Nuisance Doctrine as an Excep-
tion to the Fifth Amendment
Under principles of nuisance, a regulation
promulgated to prevent serious harm to the
public dqes not effect a taking of private
property, and consequently just compensa-
tion is not required.? The first significant
Supreme Court case addressing the nui-
sance exception wasMugler u. Kansas.24 In
Mugler, the defendant was convicted of
manufacturing beer for purposes of sale in
violation of state regulations that prohibited
the sale of intoxicating liquors.2
The defendant challenged the validity of
the prohibition, relying onPumpelly u. Green
Bay Co.,26 an eminent domain decision, for
his contention that the regulation constituted
a deprivation of his property requiring just
compensation.Y
Rejecting the defendant's reliance on
Pumpelly, the Court declared that:
[a] prohibition simply upon the use
of property for purposes that are
declared, by valid legislation, to be
injurious to the health, morals, or
safety of the community, cannot, in
any just sense, be deemed a taking
or an appropriation of property for
the public benefit. Such legislation
does not disturb the owner in the
control or use of his property for
lawful purposes, nor restrict his
right to dispose of it, but is only a
declaration by the State that its use
by any one, for certain forbidden
purposes, is prejudicial to the pub-
lic interests.?8
After disposing of the defendant's takings
claim, the Court subjected the liquor prohibi-
tion regulation to rational-basis due process
analysis.' The Court then held that the
regulation was constitutionally valid. As a
result of the decision in Mugler, regulations
that had the effect of impinging on property
rights could be challenged only by demon-
strating that they were not rationally related
to the furtherance of a legitimate state pur-
pose.3 ' The regulatory takings doctrine had
yet to surface.32
The Supreme Court consistently applied
the Mugler framework in subsequent deci-
sions involving challenges to the validity of
land use regulations. In Reinman v. City of
Little Rock,"3 the plaintiffs were seeking to
enjoin enforcement of a municipal ordi-
nance that prohibited the operation of livery
stables in the city of Little Rock.? The Court
responded to the plaintiffs' takings conten-
tion by stating that it was within the City's
police power to restrict the operation of
livery stables, so long as the rational-basis
standard of the due process clause was
satisfied.-" In Hadacheck v. Sebastian,36
the Court upheld a regulation that prohibited
the manufacture of bricks within the city of
Los Angeles.' The Court again gave wide
latitude to the state to regulate through its
police power.' These decisions confirmed
the viability of the nuisance exception to the
takings clause.39
C) Regulatory Takings
1) Nature of the Doctrine PriortoLucas
The origin of the regulatory takings doc-
trine in the Supreme Court was the 1871
case of Pumpelly u. Green Bay Co.4 In
Pumpelly, the plaintiff sought compensa-
tion from the government for damages to his
land caused by flooding.41 The flooding
21 See Chicago. Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226,239, 17 S.Ct. 581,586,41 LEd. 979 (1897).
22 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,49, 80 S.CL 1563, 1569,4 LEd.2d 1554 (1960).
23 Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590,82 S.Ct. 987, 8 LEd.2d 130 (1962); Millerv. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272,48 S.CL 246,72 LEd. 568 (1928); Hadacheck
v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394,36 S.CL 143,60 LEd. 348 (1915); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623,8 S.CL 273,31 LEd. 205 (1887).
24 123 U.S. 623,8 S.Ct. 273,31 LEd. 205 (1887).
25 123 U.S. at 624-26,31 LEd. 207-08.
26 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166,20 LEd. 557(1871). See infra, notes 40-44 and accompanying text for a discussion of Pumpelly. For decisions declining to find a regulatory
taking, see Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269, 17 S.CL 578,41 LEd. 996 (1897); Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635,25 LEd. 336 (1879); and Legal TenderCases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 20 LEd. 287 (1870).
27 Mugler, 123 U.S. at 667, 8 S.Ct. at 300.
28 123 U.S. at 668-69, 8 S.Ct. at 300-01.
29 123 U.S. at 669, 8 S.Ct. at 301.
30 123 U.S. at 671, 8 S.Ct. at 302.
31 See Robert M. Washburn, Land Use Control, The Individual, and Society: Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 52 MD. L REv. 162, 180 (1993).32 See Washburn, supra, note 31, at 179. Cf. Pumpelly, supra, note 26, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 177-78, 20 LEd. at 560-61.
33 237 U.S. 171, 35 S.Ct. 511, 59 LEd. 900 (1915).
34 237 U.S. at 172, 35 S.Ct. at 511.
35 237 U.S. at 176-77, 35 S.Ct. at 513.
36 239 U.S. 394, 36 S.CL 143, 60 LEd. 348 (1915).
37 239 U.S. at 414, 36 S.CL at 147.
38 239 U.S. at 410, 36 S.Ct at 145.
39 For other cases applying the Mugler framework see Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 82 S.Ct 987, 8 LEd.2d 130 (1962) (regulation prohibiting sand
and gravel mining did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment); and Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 48 S.Ct. 246, 72 LEd. 568 (1928) (requiring owner of infected cedar trees
to cut them down was valid exercise of the police power; no due process violation). See also Rosenthal v. New York, 226 U.S. 260.33 S.CL 27, 57 LEd. 212 (1912) Austin
v. Tennessee, 179 U.S. 343,21 S.Ct. 132,45 L.Ed. 224 (1900); Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1,9 S.CL 6,32 LEd. 346 (1888) Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 8 S.Ct.992,32 LEd. 253(1888); Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893 (Fed. Cir. 1986k Park Ave. Tower Assocs. v. City of New York, 746 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1984);Maiter of Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d 912; Hardy v. Gissendaner, 369 F. Supp. 481 (M.D. Ala. 1974); and Izaak Walton League of Am. v. St. Clair, 353 F. Supp. 698(D. Minn. 1973). For a case in which the exercise of the police power by a state was successfully challenged, see Curtin v. Benson, 222 U.S. 78,32 S.Ct 31, 56 LEd. 102 (1911).40 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166,20 LEd. 557 (1871).
41 Id. 
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resulted from a regulation which permitted a
lake abutting the plaintiff's land to rise.42 In
response to the state's argument that no
"taking" oftheplaintiff'slandhadoccurred,a
the Court stated "[ilt would be a very curious
and unsatisfactory result, if in construing (the
takings clause of the Fifth Amendment] ...
it shall beheld that if the government refrains
from the absolute conversion of real prop-
erty to the uses of the public[,] it can destroy
its value entirely . . . without making any
compensation, because, in the narrowest
sense of that word, it is not taken for the
public use.""4 The Court thus recognized
that regulations can have such an extreme
effect on ownership rights that a de facto
taking will result, even though legal title is not
affected. NotablyPumpellyinvolvedaregu-
lation that resulted in a physical invasion of
the plaintiff's land, making the regulation
one that in effect resulted in a physical taking
even absent transfer of title.
The Supreme Court had occasion to re-
fine the regulatory takings doctrine in Penn-
sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.45 Pennsylva-
nia enacted a statute that prohibited the
mining of anthracite coal "as to cause ...
subsidence of.. . . any dwelling or other
structure used as a human habitation, or any
factory, store, or other industrial or mercan-
tile establishment in which human labor is
employed."" The surface estate of the prop-
erty in question was owned by the Mahons,
but the mineral estate was owned by the coal
company.47 The Mahons sought to enjoin
the mining operations of the coal company
as a violation of the statute.48 The coal
company responded by claiming that the
only value of the mineral estate was the right
to mine the coal, and that the statute thus
resulted in the functional equivalent of a
taking by eminent domain,4 9 entitling the
coal company to compensation under the
Fifth AmendmentO
The Court initially addressed the coal
company's argument by recognizing that
generally, the state was free to regulate even
if property values fluctuated as a result.51
The Court then noted that, unlike most
regulations, the statute at issue "ha[d] very
nearly the same effect for constitutional pur-
poses as appropriating or destroying [the
coal]."52 Central to the Court's analysis was
the fact that the only value that inhered in the
coal was the right to mine it for a profit."
Justice Holmes, writing for the majority, held
that the Fifth Amendment required compen-
sation for property taken for a public use,"
and stated "[the general rule at least is, that
while property may be regulated to a certain
extent, if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking.""
Thus Pennsylvania Coal extended the
Pumpelly reasoning to a situation that did
not involve a physical invasion, giving recog-
nition for the first time to the regulatory
takings doctrine, even if its contours were
not well-defined. The doctrine lay dormant
at the Supreme Court level for over fifty years
until the decision in Penn Cent. Transp.
Co. v. New York City.M New York City
passed the Landmarks Preservation Lawn
and pursuant to this regulation, the Land-
marks Preservation Commission designated
Grand Central Terminal to be an historic
landmark, to which alterations could not be
made without the prior approval of the
Commission.m Penn Central Transporta-
tion Company, which owned the terminal,
challenged the Landmarks Law when the
Commission denied its application to con-
struct a multistory office building addition
over the terminal." Penn Central contended
that the regulation effected a taking of its
property, in violation of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments."
In determining whether an unconstitu-
tional taking had occurred, the Supreme
Court announced "several factors that have
particular significance [including] [tihe eco-
nomic impact of the regulation on the claim-
ant and, particularly, the extent to which the
regulation has interfered with distinct invest-
ment-backed expectations, ... [and] the
character of the govemmental action."6 1
The Court noted that, after the regulation
became effective, the appellants had air
rights "suitable for the construction of new
office buildings."62 The Court found that
42 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 177,20 LEd. at 560.
43 Id.
44 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 177-78, 20 LEd. at 560-61. The Court's analysis was directed at the Wisconsin State Constitution because the Fifth Amendment did not apply
to the states at the time-f this decision. See suprm, note 21 and accompanying text.
45 260 U.S. 393.43 S.Ct. 158, 67 LEd. 322 (1922).
46 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 661-71 (1966) (originally enacted as Act of May 27, 1921, 1921 Pa. Laws 1198).
47 Mahon v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 118 A. 491, 498 (Pa.) (Kephart, J., dissenting), rev'd, 260 U.S. 393.43 S.Ct 158, 67 LEd. 322 (1922).
48 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 412, 43 S.Ct. at 159.
49 260 U.S. at 401-04 (unavailable in S.Ct. or LEd.)
50 260 U.S. at 414-15, 43 S.Ct at 159-60.
51 260 U.S. at 413, 43 S.Ct. at 159.
52 260 U.S. at 414-15, 43 S.Ct. at 159-60.
53 260 U.S. at 414, 43 S.C. at 159-60.
54 260 U.S. at 415, 43 S.Ct. at 160.
55 Id.
56 438 US. 104,98 S.Ct. 2646,57 LEd.2d 631 (1978).
57 N.Y.C. Admin. Code, ch. 8-A, §§ 205-1-0 (1976).
58 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 US. at 115-16, 98 S.Ct. 2654-55 (1978).
59 438 U.S. at 116-18, 98 S.Ct. at2655-56.
60 438 U.S. at 119, 98 S.Ct. 2656-57.
61 438 U.S. at 124,98 S.Ct. at 2659. See alsoHodel v. Virginia Surface Min. and ReclamationAss'n, 452 U.S. 264, 101 S.Ct. 447.72 LEd. 842 (1981) (upholding Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 100 S.Ct. 2138, 65 LEd. 106 (1980) (upholding restrictive residential zoning).
62 438 U.S. at 137, 98 S.Ct. at 266566.
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these valuable rights6 indicated that the
regulations did not interfere unduly with
appellants' investment-backed expectations.
The Court also concluded that the Land-
marks Law was "substantially related to the
promotion of the general welfare,"" and
was thus in the same category as "previously
upheld regulations such as taxing acts, zon-
ing ordinances, and laws prohibiting danger-
ous or harmful uses of property."' The
Court did suggest, however, that a taking
would have occurred if the property had
been physically invaded."
The Supreme Court applied the Penn
Centralfactors inAgins v. Cityof Tburon.67
In Agins, the appellants purchased five acres
of unimproved land for the purpose of resi-
dential development 6 Subsequently, the city
of Tiburon enacted a zoning ordinance that
restricted acceptable uses of the property to
single-family dwellings, accessory buildings,
and open space uses.6'
The appellants challenged the zoning or-
dinance and requested a declaration that it
was unconstitutional on its face.70 They
claimed that it had the effect of "taking" their
property without just compensation, in vio-
lation of the Fifth Amendment.71 Because
the appellants did not actually seek to de-
velop their property in the manner provided
by the ordinance (i.e., by submitting a devel-
opment plan to the city)72 the only issue
presented to the Court was "whether the
mere enactment of the zoning ordinancels]
constituted] a taking."73
The Court held that a regulation consti-
tutes a taking if it "does not substantially
advance legitimate state interests, or denies
an owner economically viable use of his
land."74 The Court concluded that the ordi-
nance substantially advanced a legitimate
state interest in that it "discourage[d] the
'premature and unnecessary conversion of
open-spaceland to urban uses.'" 7sThe Court
also determined that the best possible use of
the land - residential development - was
permitted by the statute.76 Thus, the statute
did not unduly interfere with appellants in-
vestment backed expectations.?
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n,78
which involved a challenge to the govem-
mental purpose behind the enactment of a
regulation, presented the next case in which
the Supreme Court wrestled with the regula-
tory takings doctrine. In Nollan, the plain-
tiffs applied for a permit to build a home on
a beach front lot.7 Pursuant to statute,80 the
Califormia Coastal Commission required the
Nollan's to grant a public easement across
their property as a condition to receiving a
permit.81 The Supreme Court held that the
easement requirement was constitutionally
invalid because it did not "substantially ad-
vancelegitimatestateinterests."82 The Court
also stated that the easement requirement
was "not a valid regulation of land use but 'an
out-an-out plan of extortion.'"i
In the same year as the Nollan decision,
the Supreme Court further refined the regu-
latory takings doctrine in the case of First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
County of Los Angeles." In First English,
the church owned a twenty-one acre tract of
land that it used as a summer camp.y After
the property was seriously damaged by a
flood,8' the County of Los Angeles prohib-
ited rebuilding for a three year period.87 The
church claimed that it was entitled to com-
63 Id.
64 438 U.S. at 138,98 S.Ct. at 2666.
65 Washburn, supra, note 31 at 171. As examples of cases finding zoning restrictions to be protective of the public welfare, the Court cited Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S.183,48 S.Ct. 447, 72 LEd. 842 (1928); Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365,47 S.Ct. 114,71 LEd. 303(1926); Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603,47 S.CL 675, 71 LEd.1228 (1927); and Welch v. Swassey, 214 U.S. 91, 29 S.CL 567, 53 LEd. 923 (1909).
66 438 U.S. at 124, 98 S.Ct. at 2659. By "physically invaded," the Court is requiring that some actual intrusion of the property occur. See, e.g., Loretto v. TeleprompterManhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 73 LEd.2d 868 (1982) (where property was physically invaded by the installation of cable television wiring, the Courtheld that "a permanent physical occupation authorized by government is a taking without regard to the public interests that it may serve."); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444U.S. 164, 100 S.Ct. 383. 62 LEd.2d 332 (1979) (the federal government physically intruded upon an easement in property and the court held that "'the right to exclude,' souniversally held to be a fundamental element of the property right, falls within this category of interests that the Government cannot take without compensation."). Cf. PruneYardShopping Ctr. v. Robins. 447 U.S. 74, 100 S.Ct. 2035, 64 LEd.2d 741(1980). For a decision applying the Penn Central factors to a facial challenge to a zoning ordinance,
see Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 100 S.Ct. 2138, 65 LEd.2d 106 (1980) (taking occurs "if the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state interests.
. . or denies an owner economically viable use of his land."); and Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Recl. Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 101 S.Ct. 2352, 69 LEd.2d 1 (1981); and SanDiego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 101 S.CL 1287,67 LEd.2d 551 (1981).67 447 U.S. 255, 100 S.Ct. 2138,65 LEd.2d 106 (1980).
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 447 U.S. at 258, 100 S.Ct. at 2140.
71 Id.
72 447 U.S. at 260, 100 S.Ct. at 2141.
73 Id.
74 Id. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. at 138,98 S.Ct. at 2666; and Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. at 834,107 S.Ct. at 3147.75 Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. at 261, 100 S.Ct. at 2141-42 (citing Ca.. GovT. CoDE ANN. § 65561(b) (West Supp. 1979.76 447 U.S. at 262, 100 S.Ct. at 2142.
77 Id.
78 483 U.S. 825, 107 S.Ct. 3141, 97 LEd.2d 677 (1987).
79 483 U.S. at 828, 107 S.Ct. at 3143-44.
80 Cal. Pub. Res. Code §§ 30000-30900 (West 1986) (Coastal Act of 1976).81 Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. at 828, 107 S.Ct. at 3143-44. The easement would have made it much easier for the public to access a nearby publicbeach and recreation area. 483 U.S. at 827-28, 107 S.Ct at 3143-44.
82 483 U.S. at 834, 107 S.CL at 3147.
83 483 U.S. at 837, 107 S.CL at 3148-49 The Court quoted Loretto for the proposition that "'the right to exclude [is] one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rightsthat are commonly characterized as property.'" 483 U.S. at 831, 107 S.Ct. at 3145-56.
84 482 U.S. 304, 107 S.Ct. 2378,96 LEd.2d 250 (1987).
85 482 U.S. at 307, 107 S.Ct at 2381-82.
86 Id.
87 482 U.S. at 307,107 S.Ct. at 2381-82. See Los Angeles County Interim Ordinance No. 11,855 (January, 1979). The prohibition on rebuilding was made permanent
after three years. See Los Angeles County Code §20.44.220 (1981). 6 9
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pensation for not being allowed to rebuild
during the three year moratorium.'
The Supreme Court held that damages
are recoverable for a temporary taking."
The Court stated: "Where the government's
activities have already worked a taking of all
use of property, no subsequent action by the
government can relieve it of the duty to
provide compensation for the period during
which the taking was effective."90
WhileNollan reinvigorated the reasoning
of Pumpelly, that a regulation resulting in a
physical intrusion may require compensa-
tion, and while First English recognized
temporary takings as being compensable,
neither decision provided insight into how to
apply the enumerated factors in Penn Cen-
traP' for determining when a taking had
occurred.
The Supreme Court did apply the Penn
Central factors, however, inKeystone Bitu-
minous CoalAss'n u. DeBenedictis,92which
involved another a statute which prohibited
coal mining that would cause subsidence
damage to surface buildings.93 In reliance on
the statute, the State Department of Envi-
ronmental Resources prohibited the mining
of fifty percent of the coal under protected
structures.Y The coal association challenged
the statute on the grounds that it effected a
taking without just compensation, in viola-
tion of the Fifth Amendment.95
The Court upheld the statute.' The Court
found the statute prevented "a significant
threat to the common welfare."97 The Court
also noted that members of the coal associa-
tion would still be able to pursue their busi-
ness profitably after the enaction of the
statute;98 thus, their "investment-backed ex-
pectations" were not overly diminished."
Nollan, First English, and Keystone
appeared to signal a willingness of the Su-
preme Court to entertain regulatory takings
claims. Nollan stands for the proposition
that a regulation which results in a physical
invasion is invalid if it was promulgated for an
improper governmental purpose.'00 Key-
stone reiterated that a regulation is valid if it
does not interfere with investment backed
expectations.' 0 First English recognized
that temporary takings can be compen-
sable.102 Loretto U. Teleprompter Manhat-
tan CATV Corp..03 likewise recognized
that physical invasions of property are
compensable." According to a commenta-
tor, the state of the law after these decisions
was as follows:
[There was and is no question that
a land use regulation will constitute
an unconstitutional taking of pri-
vate property entitling the affected
property owner to just compensa-
tion unless it is enacted for a legiti-
mate public purpose, and it sub-
stantially advances that legitimate
purpose, and it does not involve
any physical invasion of the regu-
lated property."os
88 482 U.S. at 308, 107 S.Ct at 2382.
89 482 U.S. at 318, 107 S.Ct. at 2387-88. The Supreme Court did not decide whether an actual taking had occurred. On remand, the California Court of Appeals found
that no taking requiring just compensation had occurred. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 258 Cal. Rptr. 893, 894 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
90 First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. at 321, 107 S.Ct. at 2389 (1987).
91 See supra, note 61 and accompanying text.
92 480 U.S. 470, 107 S.Ct. 1232, 94 LEd.2d 472 (1987).
93 PA. STAT. ANr. tit. 52, § 1406.4 (1986).
94 Keystone, 480 U.S. at 477, 107 S.CL at 1238.
95 480 U.S. at 478-79, 107 S.Ct at 1238-39.
96 480 U.S. at 479-81, 107 S.Ct at 1238-40.
97 480 U.S. at 485, 107 S.Ct. at 1241-42.
98 Id.
99 Id. Cf. Penn Cent Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. at 124,98 S.Ct. at 2659 (the Court held that the New York City Landmark Preservation Law did not effect
a taking of the plaintiff's property as they could still realize a "reasonable retum" on their investment and there was no physical invasion of the property.)
100 See Nollan v. Califonia Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. at837, 107 S.Ct at 3148-49. Cf. Agins v. City ofTiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 100 S.Ct. 2138.65 LEd.2d 106 (1980);
Reinman v. City of little Rock, supra, notes 33-35 and accompanying text; and Mugler v. Kansas, supra, notes 24-32 and accompanying text.
101 See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. at 485, 107 S.Ct. at 1241-42. Cf. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, supra, notes 45-55 and
accompanying text; and Penn Cent Transp. Co. v. New York City, supra, notes 56-66, and accompanying text
102 See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. at 318,107 S.Ct. at 2387-88.
103 458 U.S. 419, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 73 LEd.2d 868 (1982).
104 See Loretto, supra, note 66. Cf. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 100 S.Ct. 383, 62 LEd.2d 332 (1979); and PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins. 447
U.S. 74, 100 S.Ct. 2035,64 LEd.2d 741 (1980).
105 Washburn, supra, note 31 at 177. For other discussions of the regulatory takings doctrine prior to Lucas, see Gregory S. Alexander, Takings, Narratives, and Power.
88Conu. L REv. 1752 (1988); Lawrence Blume &Daniel L Rubinfeld, Compensations for Takings: An EconomicAnalysis, 72CAL. L REv. 569 (1984); Raymond R. Coletta.
Reciprocity of Advantage and Regulatory Takings: Toward a New Theory of Takings Jurisprudence, 40 AM.U. L REv. 297 (1991); John J. Costonis, Presumptive & Per
Se Takings: A Decisional Model for the Taking Issue, 58 N.Y.U. L REv. 465 (1983); Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Descent and Resurrection, 1987 Sup.CT. Rev. 1 (1988);
William A. Falik & Anna C. Shimko, The 'Takings' Nexus - The Supreme Court Chooses a New Direction in Land-Use Planning: A View from California, 39 HAsnrcs
LJ. 359 (1988); Gilbert L Finnell, Jr., Public Access to Coastal Public Property: Judicial Theories and the Taking Issue, 67 N.C. L REv. 627 (1989); William W. Fisher,
111, The Significance of Public Perceptions of the Takings Doctrine, 88 CoLum. L Rev. 1774 (1988); Douglas Kmiec, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause
is Neither Weak Nor Obtuse, 88 Couwi. L REv. 1630 (1988); Earl M. Maltz, The Prospects for a Revival of Conservative Activism in Constitutional Jurisprudence, 24
GA. L REv. 629 (1990); Roger J. Marzula & NancieG. Marzulia, Regulatory Takings in the United States Claims Court: Adjusting the Burdens that in Fairness and Equity
Ought to be Borne bySociety as a Whole, 40Cam.U. L REv. 549 (1991); Frank Michelman. Takings, 1987, 88Cowm. L REv. 1630 (1988); Andrea L Peterson, The Takings
Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles Part II- Takings as Intentional Deprivations of Property Without Moral Justification, 78 CAL L REv. 53 (1990); Andrea L
Peterson, The Takings Clause- In Searchof Underlying Principles Part I- A Critique ol Current Takings Clause Doctrine, 77CAL. L REv. 1301 (1989); Michael J. Phillips,
Another Look at Economic Substantive Due Process, 1987 Ws. L REv. 265 (1987); Carol M. Rose, Property Rights, Regulatory Regimes and the New Takings
Jurisprudence-An Evolutionary Approach, 57 TEm. L REv. 577 (1990); Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue is Still a Muddle, 57 S.CAL. L
REv. 561 (1984); Joseph L Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74YALE LJ. 36 (1964); Michael H. Schill, Intergovernmental Takings and Just Compensation: A Question
ofFederolism, 137U.PA. L REv.829(1989h RandalT. ShepardLand UseRegulation in the Rehnquist Court: TheFifth AmendmentandJudicial Intervention, 38CAM.U.
L REv. 847 (1989) (continued on page 71)
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More recently, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit found a
compensable taking to have occurred in a
situation somewhat similar to Pennsylvania
Coal. In Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United
States,'0 a mining company sought just
compensation for being denied, by the Sur-
face Mining Control and Reclamation act
(SMCRA),' 7 the right to mine its coal. 08
The court noted that the SMCRA deprived
the coal company of "'all economically viable
use' of its property."'09 The court then
rejected the government's claim that Key-
stone stood for the proposition that no
compensable taking occurs if the challenged
regulation serves a valid public purpose."o
Rather, a taking occurs underKeystone "if [a
regulation] either (1) 'does not substantially
advance legitimate state interests,' or (2)
'denies an owner economically viable use of
his land.'""'
The court's finding that the coal had no
economic value apart from the right to mine
it is beyond cavil. It was unclear, however, if
the Court would extend the "no economic
viability" rationale to property other than
mineral rights. Theoretically, the analysis
should be the same, yet most forms of
property have varied uses, and regulations
typically impact less than all of these uses. It
is this issue that the Supreme Court faced in
Lucas.
2) The Lucas Decision
In Lucas u. South Carolina Coastal Coun-
cil," 2 the plaintiff owned two beachfront
lots 13 on which he intended to construct
single-family residences. 14 Two years after
his acquisition of the lots, however, South
Carolina passed the Beachfront Manage-
ment Act (Act)."s That Act prohibited the
constructionofdwellingsonthelots.n 6 Lucas
admitted that the state validly exercised its
police power in enacting the statute.' 17 He
contended, however, that the Act denied
him all reasonable economic use of his lots,
thus entitling him to compensation regard-
less of the Act's validity."'
The Supreme Court of South Carolina
denied Lucas' takings claim." 9 It concluded
that no taking had occurred because the
statute was a valid exercise of the police
power designed to preserve public re-
sources.120 The South Carolina Supreme
Court agreed with Lucas that the Act caused
his lots to be valueless,121 but found the
validity of the statute to be controlling.'"2 In
effect, the South Carolina Supreme Court
determined that the purpose of the Act was
to prevent a nuisance, creating an exception
to the requirement of just compensation123
The United States Supreme Court 24 took
cognizance of the lower court's finding that
Lucas' lots were rendered valueless by the
Act12s This finding was accepted by the
Court for purposes of its decision. 6 The
Court then stated that two situations cat-
egorically required that just compensation be
paid toa property owner. The first was when
105 (Continued) Symposium on Richard Epstein's Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain, Proceedings of the Conference on Takings of Property
and the Constitution, 41 U. Mium L REv. 49 (1986); Richard G. Wilkins, The Takings Clause: A Modem Plot for an Old Constitutional Tale, 64 NoTRE DAME L REv. 1
(1989); Lynn Ackerman, Comment, Searching for a Standard for Regulatory Takings Based on Investment-Backed Expectations: A Survey of State Court Decisions in
the Vested Rights andZoning Estoppel Areas, 36EMony L.J. 1219 (1987); Lawrence W. Andreas, Comment,Trespass at High Tide: The Supreme Court Gives Heightened
Scrutiny to a State Imposed Easement Requirement, 54 BRooK. L REv. 991 (1989); Cynthia J. Barnes, Comment, Just Compensation or Just Damages: The Measure
of Damages for Temporary Regulatory Takings in Wheeler u. City of Pleasant Grove, 74 IOWA L REv. 1243 (1989); David B. Fawcett, l, Comment, Eminent Domain,
The Police Power, and the Fifth Amendment: Defining the Domain of the Takings Analysts, 47U. Prrr. L REv. 491 (1986); W. Keith Noel, Comment, Just Compensation:
The Constitutionally Required Remedy for Regulatory Takings, 55 U. CN. L REv. 1237 (1987); Terri Pandolfi, Comment, Putting the Cart Before the Horse: Just
Compensation for Regulatory Takings in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church u. County of Los Angeles, 54 BRooK. L REv. 1413 (1989); Stuart Minor Benjamin,
Note, The Applicability of Just Compensation to Substantive Due Process Claims, 100 YAi LJ. 2667 (1991); Nicholas V. Morosoff, Note, Take" My Beach, Please!:
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission and a Rational-Nexus ConstitutionalAnalysis of Development Exactions, 69B.U. L REv. 823 (1989); Note, Takinga Step Back:
A Reconsideration of the Takings Test of Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 102 HAmv. L REv. 448 (1988); and William Michael Treanor, Note, The Origins and.
Original Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YAE LJ. 694 (1984).
106 926 F.2d 1169 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
107 30 U.S.C. §§ 1202-1328 (1988).
108 Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 926 F.2d at 1171.
109 Id. at 1172.
110 Id. at 1176.
111 Id. at 1176, (quoting Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. at 490, 107 S.CL 1244-45, quoting Agins u. City of TIburon, 447 U.S. at 260,
100 S.Ct. at 2141, and citing Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124, 98 S.Ct. at 2659). These factors are essentially a reformulation of the factors listed in Penn Central. See Penn
Central, 438 U.S. at 124, 98 S.Ct. at 2659.
112 -U.S.._, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 120 LEd.2d 798(1992).
113 _U.S., 112 S.CL at 2889.
114 Id.
115 S.C. Code Ann. §§ 48-39-10-48-39-360 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992).
116 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, _U.S._, 112 S. CL at 2889. The construction of certain nonhabitable improvements was allowed by the Act. See S.C. Code
Ann. §§ 48-39-290(AX1),(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992).
117 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, _U.S._, 112 S. Ct. at 2890. Cf. Mugler, Reinman, and Hadacheck, supra, notes 23-39 and accompanying text.
118 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, _U.S._, 112 S.Ct. at 2890.
119 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 896 (S.C. 1991).
120 Id. at 898.
121 Id. at 900.
122 Id. at 896.
123 Id. at 899. The South Carolina Legislature determined that erosion in the beachfront areas of the state was a problem only when structures were erected near the beach
dunes system. Id. at 380-81. See supra, notes 22-38 and accompanying text for adiscussion of the nuisance exception to the Fifth Amendment requirement of just compensation.
124 Justice Scalia wrote for the majority and was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, O'Connor, and Thomas.
125 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, __U.S._, 112 S. CL at 2896.
126 Id. at n.9. Several justices questioned the validity of the "zero value" finding, however. See dissent and concurring opinion.
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a regulation caused a physical invasion of the'
property to occur." The second was when
a "regulation denies all economically benefi-
cial or productive use of land.""'a Based on
the finding that Lucas' lots had been de-
prived of all economic value, he fit within the
second category.
Even though Lucas' land had been de-
prived of all economic value, the state con-
tended that the nuisance exception to the
Fifth Amendment did not allow Lucas to
obtain compensation."1 TheSupreme Court
agreed that the Mugler line of cases'so did
allow property values to diminish from regu-
lation without a duty by the state to provide
just compensation.131 The Court observed,
however, that defining a nuisance often is
difficult.132 In many instances, the legislature
simply could frame the statute so that it
purported to prevent a public harm.133 This
approach to takings cases essentially would
"nullify Mahon's affirmation of limits to the
noncompensable exercise of the police
power."m4 The Court then held that"[w]here
the State seeks to sustain regulation that
deprives land of all economically beneficial
use, we think it may resist compensation
only if the logically antecedent inquiry into
the nature of the owner's estate shows that
the proscribed use interests were not part of
his title to begin with."'s
In determining whether "the proscribed
use interests were not part of his title to begin
with," common law nuisance principles
should govem." Thus, if a regulation pro-
scribes uses of property that are not a com-
mon law nuisance and the property loses all
value as a result, compensation to the owner
is required. Essentially, this formulation of
the regulatory takings doctrine seeks to pro-
tect investment backed expectations.'37 If a
use of property is considered a common law
nuisance, the owner should have known that
the use was subject to proscription. Property
owners, however, have no way of knowing
whether future regulations will proscribe uses
of their property that are currently permit-
ted.
H1. DiscussioN
A) Implications of Lucas
Lucas confirmed the applicability of the
"no economic viability" framework to rights
in property other than mineral interests.
This framework, conceptually, is easy to
grasp. If a regulation is not a valid exercise
of the police power or the property loses all
value as a result of the regulation, just com-
pensationtothepropertyownerisrequired. 38
Viewed in this light, Lucas did not cause the
protection of property rights to be extended;
it merely affirmed and clarified existing law.
Lucas should not be viewed as a
groundbreakingdecisioninthepropertyrights
arena.
As the majority suggests, ... the
vastly greater number of contro-
versial land use regulations do not
involve the control of noxious uses,
do further a legitimate state inter-
est, and diminish - but do not
destroy - the economic value of
the affected properties.. .Further,
in the increasing number of non-
categorical cases involving envi-
ronmental and similar socially de-
sirable regulations, the takings de-
termination will continue to be an
ad hoc balancing of the sufficiency
of the public interests supported by
the regulation under challenge with
the significance of the private
costs.us
The Lucas majority acknowledged that
the categorical rule it announced did not
clarify the property interest "against which
the loss of value is to be measured." 40
"When, for example, a regulation requires a
developer to leave ninety percent of a rural
tract in its natural state, it is unclear whether
[the Court] would analyze the situation as
one in which the owner has been deprived of
all economically beneficial use of the bur-
dened portion of the tract, or as one in which
the owner has suffered a mere diminution in
value of the tract as a whole."14 1 Since
property is rarely devalued entirely by a
regulation, much litigation can be expected
over this issue.
The majority acknowledged an anomaly
created by the Lucas decision that was
observed by Justice Stevens.142 Only land-
owners suffering a total devaluation of their
property are able to claim the benefits of the
categorical rule; those with less than a total
127 _U.S._, 112S.Ct. at 2893 (citing Lorettov. Teleprompter Manhattan CATVCorp., 458 U.S. 419,102 S.Ct. 3164,73 LEd.2d (1982); KaiserAetnaiv. United States,
444 U.S. 164, 100 S.Ct 383, 62 LEd.2d 332 (1979); and United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256,66 S.C. 1062,90 LEd. 1206 (1946)).
128 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, _U.S_, 112 S. Ct at 2893 (citing Aginsv. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 100 S.Ct 2138, 65 LEd.2d 106 (1980); Nollan
v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 107 S.CL 3141,97 LEd.2d 677 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 107 S.Ct. 1232, 94
LEd.2d 472 (1987); and Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 101 S.CL 2352, 69 LEd.2d 1 (1981).
129 Lucas v. SoutliCarolina Coastal Council, _-U.S.-, 112 S. Ct. at 2896-97.
130 See supm notes 23-39 for a discussion of the Mugler line of cases.
131 _U.S._, 112 S.CL ar 2896-98.
132 Id.
133 _U.S.._, 112 S.Ct at 2898. "Since such a justification can be formulated in practically every case, this amounts to a test of whether the legislature has a stupid staff.
We think the Takings Clause requires courts to do more than insist upon artful harm-preventing characterizations." U.S._, 112 S.CL at 2898 n.12.
134 __U.S._, 112 S.CL at 2899.
135 Id.
136 _U.S_ 112 S.Ct. at 2901.
137 The ramifications of both the South Carolina Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court's decision in Lucas have been the focus of much discussion. See,
e.g., Richard C. Ausness, Wild Dunes & Serbonian Bogs: The Impact of the Lucas Decision on Shoreline Protection Programs, 70 DeNER U. L REv. 437 (1993) Ingrid
Brydolf, Property Right: Takings 22 ENvn.. LJ. 1115 (1992); Steven S. Eagle & William H. Mellor, Ill, Regulatory Takings After the Supreme Court's 1991-92 Term: An
Evolving Return to Property Rights, 29 CAL. WESmR L REv. 209 (1992); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., A Critical Reexamination of the Takings Jurisprudence, 90 MicH. L REv.
1892 (1992); Washburn, supro note 31; Flint B. Ogle, Comment, The Ongoing Struggle Between Private PropertyRights and Wetlands Regulation: Recent Developments
and Proposed Solutions, 64U.CoLo.L Rev. 573 (1993); Natasha Zalkin, Comment,ShiftingSandsand ShiftingDoctrines: TheSupreme Court's Takings Doctrine Through
and South Carolina's Coastal Zone Statute, 79 CAuw. L REv. 207 (1991); Laurie G. Ballenger, Note, A House Bull on Sand: Lucas u. South Carolina Coastal Council,
71 N.C. L REv. 928 (1993); and Arm T. Kadlecek, Note, The Effect of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council on the Law of Regulatory Takings, 68 WAsH. L REv. 415(1993).
138 See supro, note 105 and accompanying text.
139 Washburn, supro, note 31 at 202-03 (citing Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council. U.S._ 112 S. Ct at 2894).
140 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, _U.S._, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7.
141 Id. See also Bino v. Hurley, 76 N.W.2d 571 (1956) (denial of riparian's right to use surface of lake for public water supply).
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loss are limited to the Penn Central balanc-
ing approach. 4 3 "It is true that in at least
some cases the landowner with 95% loss will
get nothing, while the landowner with total
loss will recover in full. But that occasional
result is no more strange than the gross
disparity between the landowner whose pre-
mises are taken for a highway (who recovers
in full) and the landowner whose property is
reduced to 5% of its former value by the
highway (who recovers nothing). Takings
law is full of these 'all or nothing' situa-
tions." 44
AfterLucas, two situations that are poten-
tial breeding grounds of litigation remain: (1)
What is the relevant property interest for
purposes of measuring a total deprivation
from a regulation?; and (2) What is the status
of property owners who have suffered less
than a total deprivation from a regulation?
State property rights statutes have attempted
to address these concerns.
B) "Weak" Property Rights Statutes
"Weak" property rights legislation is the
type that requires a study of the takings
impact of a regulation before it is promul-
gated. Arizona, for example, requires "[sitate
agencies [to) be sensitive to, anticipate and
account for the obligations imposed by the
fifth and fourteenth amendments of the Con-
stitution of the United States and article H, §
17 of the Constitution of Arizona in planning
and carrying out governmental actions to
avoid imposing unanticipated or undue addi-
tional burdens on the public treasury." 45
The statute then specifies guidelines for per-
forming a "constitutional taking implication
assessment."s4 6 Utah requires state agen-
cies, before promulgating a regulation that
could affect property rights, to hold a public
hearing and prepare a written statement
regarding the rights of the affected property
owners."14
Notably, "weak" property rights statutes
















tion beyond that guaranteed by the Fifth
Amendment.1 4 8 Thus, this form of legisla-
tion does not provide any guidance in the
situations left open by Lucas. Although this
legislation is sponsored by advocates of prop-
erty rights,'49 it may further their cause only
indirectly by creating awareness of the prop-
erty rights impact of regulations; it won't lead
to an extension of property rights. In fact, it
may be financially prudent for states to enact
this type of legislation. States must balance
their goal of preserving the environment
with their goal of conserving the fisc. In
Whitney Benefits, the government was re-
quired to pay a property owner over sixty
million dollars in just compensation."s A
takings assessment prior to the implementa-
tion of the regulation would have allowed the
govemment to determine if the benefits pro-
duced by the regulation were worth $60
million, possibly avoiding a needless drain of
resources.
Although environmentalists are averse to
"weak" property rights legislation,' 5 it will
not effect any significant change in takings
law. It may assuage the fears of property
owners, however, that the government is
running roughshod over their constitutional
rights. Further, this legislation will allow
states to make more informed choices about
regulation. This legislation has much to rec-
ommend it.
C) "Strong" Property Rights Legislation
"Strong" property rights legislation ad-
dresses one of the issues left open by Lucas.
Specifically, a 50% "trigger point" is estab-
lished at which a property owner can obtain
compensation for a deprivation in value.
This type of legislation has been introduced
in ten states,152 but has yet to be enacted.
Environmentalists call "strong" property
rights statutes "the worst anti-environmental
[legislation) ever [proposed] in the United
States."l15
"Strong" property rights legislation does
not directly address the first issue left open by
Lucas - measuring the property interest
that has been affected. Presumably, this
omission is cured by setting a bright-line 50%
rule. In theory, a bright line rule is desirable
to reduce uncertainty and litigation. In prac-
tice, however, the uncertainty and litigation
may continue, only over different issues.
Measuring property values is an extremely
subjective determination. Appraisal testi-
mony is notoriously unreliable.s' Thus, rather
than litigation over constitutional takings
issues, this legislation could engender litiga-
tion over the decline in value of the property.
The uncertainty and litigation are not dimin-
ished, they are merely transferred to different
issues.
III. CONCLUSION
The idea behind "strong" property rights
legislation is noble. Providing a clear cut
standard could conserve judicial resources
and provide a degree of certainty to all
concerned; however, legislatures should think
carefully before implementing these statutes.
Some means to ascertain property values
must be provided before this legislation can
be effective. Perhaps an independent ap-
praisal board could be established. Determi-
nations of this board would be entitled to
deference by the courts, and could be over-
turned only upon a showing of abuse of
discretion. If the uncertainties inherent in
"strong" property rights statutes can be ironed
out, this legislation could prove to be benefi-
cial. The tension between environmental
groups and property rights advocates, how-
ever, can be expected to escalate signifi-
cantly as the state legislatures become the
battleground in the "war" over property
rights which a property owner can obtain
compensation for a deprivation in value.
This type of legislation has been introduced
in ten statesu but has yet to be enacted.
Environmentalists call "strong" property
rights statutes "the worst anti-environmental
[legislation] ever [proposed] in the United
States."'s
_U.S._, 112 S.CL at 2919.
_U.S.-, 112 S.CL at 2895 n.8; see supra, note 61 and accompanying text.
-U.S.., 112 S.CL at 2895.
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